Previously developed models of reproductive skew have overlooked one of the main reasons why subordinates might remain in a group despite restricted opportunities to breed: the possibility of social queuing, i.e. acquiring dominant status in the future. Here, we present a dynamic ESS model of skew in animal societies that incorporates both immediate and future ¢tness consequences of the decisions taken by group members, based on their probability of surviving from one season to the next (when postbreeding survival probabilities drop to zero, our analysis reduces to the model produced by Reeve and Ratnieks in 1993, which considered only a single breeding season). This allows us to compare the delayed bene¢ts of philopatry and the immediate opportunities for independent breeding. We show that delayed bene¢ts greatly reduce the need for dominants to o¡er reproductive concessions to retain subordinates peacefully in the group. Moreover, this e¡ect is strong enough that di¡erences in survival have a much greater impact on the group structure than di¡erences in other parameters, such as relatedness. When the possibility of acceding to dominant status is taken into account, groups where the dominant completely monopolizes reproduction can be stable, even if they consist of unrelated individuals, and even if subordinates have a reasonably high probability of winning a ¢ght for dominance. Finally, we show that stable groups are possible even if association leads to a decrease in current productivity. Subordinates may still stand to gain from group membership under these circumstances, as acquiring breeding positions by queuing may be more e¤cient than the attempt to establish a new territory. At the same time, the dominant may be unable to exclude unwelcome subordinates, may enjoy increased survival when they are present, or may gain indirect bene¢ts from allowing relatives to stay and queue for dominance. We conclude that reproductive skew in animal groups, ranging from eusocial insect colonies to mating aggregations (leks), will be strongly in£uenced by the future prospects of group members.
INTRODUCTION
In most types of animal group, the bene¢ts of association are unevenly shared among group members. In cooperatively breeding groups (families; reviewed in Emlen (1995 Emlen ( , 1997 ), foraging groups (Ranta et al. 1993) and leks (Mackenzie et al. 1995; Widemo & Owens 1995) , for example, dominant individuals often enjoy a disproportionately large share of reproduction, food or mates. However, a group will only prove stable if subordinate members receive a large enough share of such bene¢ts to make staying worthwhile, since they will otherwise depart. Models of reproductive skew (e.g. Vehrencamp 1979 Vehrencamp , 1983a Reeve & Ratnieks 1993; Reeve 1998; have therefore suggested that in breeding groups, dominants may have to concede a share of reproduction which they might otherwise have claimed for themselves, in order to retain subordinates in the group (though see Cant 1998; Clutton-Brock 1998; Reeve et al. 1998; , for alternative explanations for incomplete skew). Such concessions can prove worthwhile, from a dominant's perspective, when the contribution of subordinates to group productivity outweighs the share the dominant must yield.
In emphasizing the need for reproductive concessions, however, models of reproductive skew have overlooked one of the main reasons why subordinates might remain in the group: the possibility of inheriting dominant status (and hence control over local resources) in the future (Wiley & Rabenold 1984; Koenig et al. 1992; Zack & Stutchbury 1992; Lucas et al. 1997; Ragsdale 1999) . In temporally stable groups, a reassessment of membership needs to be made each time a member dies or leaves, and individuals often take over superior positions according to age (although precedence may be reassessed in ¢ghts and challenges). When some degree of hierarchy is preserved over time, one can speak of a queue towards dominant status. Social queues of this kind are widely recognized in animal societies (e.g. Kuester & Paul 1988; Blanckenhorn & Caraco 1992; Zabel et al. 1992; Herrera & MacDonald 1993; Holekamp & Smale 1993; Creel & Waser 1994; Poston 1997; Field et al. 1999) and provide a compelling reason for subordinates to remain (Wiley & Rabenold 1984) , even in the absence of reproductive concessions.
In this paper, we present an ESS model of reproductive skew that takes into account the delayed bene¢ts of staying in the local group, i.e. the possibility of subordinates acceding to breeding status following the death of the current dominant. Our model is based on the framework of Reeve & Ratnieks's (1993) concession model. However, while they focus on only a single breeding season, we assess the lifetime ¢tness consequences of the actions that group members may take, based on their probability of surviving from one season to the next. The resulting dynamic skew model enables us to compare both immediate and delayed advantages of staying versus dispersing using a common currency of lifetime inclusive ¢tness. In this way, we aim to determine how group formation and reproductive skew are in£uenced by the future prospects of group members (see Ragsdale (1999) , for an alternative analysis of this problem, which was developed independently of our own). While our model is phrased in terms of reproductive skew theory in cooperatively breeding societies, it is applicable to many kinds of group in which the bene¢ts of association are unequally shared among members.
THE MODEL
We consider the smallest possible group (and thus the shortest possible queue), which comprises two individuals: a dominant and a subordinate. We assume that dominance is determined by priority, so that the most recent arrival is subordinate. The two-person game we present can be considered an extension of the skew model of Reeve & Ratnieks (1993) , as it reduces to their analysis if the number of breeding cycles is restricted to one. Other models of reproductive skew, such as those assuming incomplete control (Cant 1998; Reeve et al. 1998) , multiple group members or dominant bidding (Reeve 1998) , could be similarly extended to encompass future bene¢ts.
Many of the model parameters are retained from earlier skew models (a complete list of symbols is given in table 1). The productivity of the group, k, is now measured during one breeding cycle, whereas the ¢tness of an individual accumulates throughout her lifetime. As in the Reeve & Ratnieks's (1993) model, we assume that the productivity (per time unit) of a lone breeder equals one. However, we do not make their assumption that k 41, as the presence of a queuer waiting for future bene¢ts does not necessarily improve the current productivity of the group. The variable x is de¢ned as the probability that an individual who departs becomes established as a lone breeder. Low values of x have thus been described as indicating strong`ecological constraints' (Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 ). While we continue using this terminology here, we emphasize that the establishment probability is also in£uenced by the life history of the species (see ½ 3). Finally, the probability that a subordinate wins a lethal ¢ght against the dominant is f, and the fraction of group productivity that the dominant yields to the subordinate is denoted p.
We proceed with the development of the dynamic skew model in three steps. First, we introduce survival probabilities from one breeding season to the next, investigate how survival a¡ects the probability that a subordinate eventually inherits the dominant position, and derive expressions for lifetime inclusive ¢tness for dominants, subordinates and lone breeders. Second, using these expressions, we consider whether staying incentives (concessions of reproduction given by a dominant to make the subordinate stay) are needed for group stability. Third, we similarly investigate the need for peace incentives (concessions given to make the subordinate refrain from ¢ghting for dominance).
(a) Fitness in a dynamic setting
We denote survival probabilities from one breeding cycle to another by s D , s S and s L for a dominant (with a subordinate present in the group), a subordinate and a lone breeder, respectively. It follows that a subordinate who stays in the group will eventually inherit the local resource and become (initially) a lone breeder at that site with probability
The value of q and hence the importance of queuing generally increases with survival, although queuing becomes less successful in cases where dominants are very long-lived while subordinates lag behind in their survival prospects (¢gure 1). Ignoring relatedness and all details of the dynamic ¢tness prospects when establishing a breeding site, equation (1) already suggests that queuing can dramatically increase the stability of groups. An individual will bene¢t from staying within the group if the probability of inheriting the local resource is greater than the probability of breeding elsewhere (i.e. q 4 x), even if it is completely unrelated to the dominant, has no chances of challenging the dominant's status and never gains any reproductive concessions from the dominant. The simple probability that the subordinate will outlive the dominant is enough to form the bene¢t.
In a more complete model, we need to take into account relatedness r, as well as possible time-lags in acquiring a new subordinate if there is currently none. The latter is incorporated as the probability a of a solitary breeder being joined by a subordinate during the time span of one breeding cycle. We start by de¢ning w D ( p), w S ( p) and w L ( p), the expected direct lifetime ¢tness of a dominant, a subordinate and a lone breeder, respectively, when the reproductive share for the subordinate equals p. By adding current breeding success to the future component of ¢tness, which is scaled by the transition probabilities to each stage, we get
Solving for w D ( p), w S ( p) and w L ( p) gives the solutions
(b) Staying incentives
A staying incentive p s is intended to make staying a better option for the subordinate than leaving. To solve p s , the following questions must be asked (see Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 We note that question (Siii) needs to be asked even if p s 0 is acceptable to the subordinate, since individuals waiting for future success do not necessarily increase the productivity of the group (i.e. k need not be greater than 1). The outcome of a case where waiting without reproduction (p s 0) is accepted by the subordinate, but not by the dominant, depends on whether forceful ejection from the group is possible (see ½ 3).
The questions (Si)^(Siii) translate to the following conditions:
Substituting equation (3) into conditions (Si)^(Siii) yields solutions (not shown because of their length) that con¢rm the queuing advantage: stable, cooperative associations can form even between completely unrelated individuals because of the interest of subordinates in inheriting the resource. The need for reproductive concessions is reduced when survival increases (¢gure 2a,b), although an exception is again found in cases where dominant survival is very high and subordinates su¡er a survival disadvantage (¢gure 2c). Although high relatedness reduces the concessions needed (as in the classical skew model), changes in survival have a much stronger e¡ect than relatedness. Concessions are not needed at all in almost all cases where reasonably high survival (say, s 4 0.5) combines with a reasonable degree of ecological constraints (say, x 5 0.5) (¢gure 2; note also that positive survival from one season to the next, s S 4 0, and not positive relatedness r 4 0, is the key factor that determines whether stable groups can exist without concessions). It should be noted that ecological constraints x, which also strongly in£uence the stability of groups, are also partly determined by survival: x equals the probability that a leaving individual will end up establishing a new breeding site and has thus a direct relationship to dispersal mortality. By contrast, the parameter a, which scales the time that a lone breeder is expected to spend alone, has very little in£uence on the solutions. Not surprisingly, increasing group productivity k improves the stability of groups. When dominants can control group membership, helping, i.e. k 41, is required for group stability if subordinates are unrelated and survival values are independent of group size (¢gure 3a).
Dynamic skew theory H. Kokko and R. A. Johnstone 573 Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1999) Figure 1 . Queuing success q (the probability that the waiting subordinate outlives the dominant) as a function of survival. Curves from top to bottom give cases where subordinate survival exceeds dominant survival, the two survival values are equal (excluding the point s D s S 1, which assumes immortality and produces a singularity in equation 1), and where the subordinate has a survival disadvantage. An unrelated individual who does not gain reproductive concessions will attempt to stay in the group whenever queuing success exceeds its chances of independent reproduction, i.e. q 4 x. Queuing success q increases with increasing survival, except in the case where survival of dominants is very high and exceeds subordinate survival.
With strict ecological constraints (small x), any increase in productivity (k 41) gives stability without the need for concessions, while weaker constraints (larger x) mean that a greater value of group productivity k is required, but also that the subordinate can claim a share in reproduction. In the case of related individuals, dominants may accept the presence of subordinates that harm current reproduction (k 51) provided that ecological constraints are strict (¢gure 3b). This region illustrates the possibility of parental facilitation through prolonged brood care (Brown & Brown 1984; Brown 1987; Ekman et al. 1994) , where parents allow the young of previous years to stay using their resources, even if none of them help to rear new o¡spring.
There also exists an alternative way of ¢nding stable groups with decreased group productivity k 51. If the presence of the subordinate improves the survival of the dominant, the dominant will trade o¡ current productivity k against its own survival s D and tolerate k 51 even from unrelated individuals (¢gure 3c). Improvements in the dominant's survival need be neither large nor`intentional' to generate the tolerance; for example, a passive predation dilution e¡ect could su¤ce. However, dominants are not expected to accept arbitrarily large reductions in current productivity. There hence exists a region with low k and low x where the subordinate would bene¢t from queuing (especially if subordinates also gain the survival advantage as in ¢gure 3c), but as its presence harms current productivity, the dominant is likely to attempt eviction. How such a con£ict is resolved depends on how membership in a group is determined ; see ½ 3).
(c) Peace incentives
Assuming that the subordinate stays, a peace incentive p p may be necessary to ensure that it does not pay for the subordinate to try to kill the dominant (Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 ). In the current setting, the peace incentive is derived by a three-step process analogous to the staying incentives: skew model (¢gure 4). When dominance status increases mortality, ¢ghting may not occur, even if peace incentives are not o¡ered and subordinates are unrelated and have a high probability of winning a ¢ght (¢gure 4b); queuing may be a more e¤cient way than ¢ghting to inherit the resource.
Where needed, peace incentives are usually smaller if individuals are related, but not always: as an example, survival % 0X5 and very high ¢ghting ability of the subordinate in ¢gure 4a leads to a case where p p % 0X9 if r 0, but p p 1 if r 0.5. With such a high probability of the subordinate winning a ¢ght, the dominant does best by e¡ectively accepting a change in the dominant hierarchy, which reverses the roles of the dominant and the subordinate (region`R' in ¢gure 4). (To prevent endless reversals we must assume that ¢ghting abilities are individual properties and are not`inherited' by status.) A role reversal may happen more easily if individuals are related, as the former dominant has some interest in the former subordinate's reproduction as well. But even among unrelated individuals and with a complete skew in the new dominance order, the dominant may accept a role reversal and completely abandon all immediate reproductive rights given enough threat f combined with a high survival probability (¢gure 4a). Again, the prospects of eventually outliving the new dominant su¤ce to make the ¢tness gain from staying in the group positive (equation (1)).
As a major di¡erence to the staying incentives, relatedness r has a very strong e¡ect on the region where peace incentives are needed (¢gure 4)örelatives clearly need them less often. In the context of queuing, lethal ¢ghting can be considered an extreme form of`queue-jumping'. For non-relatives, the only purpose of staying in the queue is to end up in the top position (if concessions are not given). Relatives, on the other hand, can gain indirect ¢tness already while in the queue, and they also value the future success of their kin. Non-relatives are therefore less likely to obey orderly`queuing rules' than relatives and can claim peace incentives at lower relative ¢ghting abilities.
DISCUSSION
Our model reduces to Reeve & Ratnieks's (1993) concession-based skew model when post-breeding survival is set to zero. Therefore, it too allows group formation based on concessions, and we ¢nd that most of the predictions of their model are retained in our dynamic version: concessions generally decrease with relatedness r (although exceptions are now possible), and increase when prospects of independent breeding, x, or ¢ghting ability of subordinates, f, improve.
At the same time, however, our model reveals that survival probabilities greater than zero greatly reduce the need for concessions. This e¡ect is strong enough that di¡erences in survival can have a much greater impact on the results than di¡erences in other parameters, such as relatedness. When the possibility of acceding to dominant status is taken into account, groups where the dominant completely monopolizes reproduction can be stable, even if they consist of unrelated individuals, and even if subordinates have a reasonably high probability of winning a ¢ght for dominance. Such cases are not permitted in existing concession models (e.g. Reeve & Ratnieks 1993; Reeve 1998) , which ignore the potential future bene¢ts of acceding to dominance, yet examples are abundantly found in nature: many long-term bird studies suggest that some helpers are unrelated to the young they care for (reviewed in Stacey & Koenig 1990) , and recent evidence from birds (superb fairy-wrens Malurus cyaneus, Dunn et al. 1995) and mammals (suricates Suricata suricatta, Clutton-Brock et al. 1999) shows that helping behaviour can be completely independent of relatedness.
The suggestion that subordinates may accept a nonbreeding position in a group because of the possible future bene¢ts to be gained has been referred to as thè bene¢ts of philopatry' hypothesis (Stacey & Ligon 1987) . It was originally contrasted with the`ecological constraint' hypothesis, which emphasizes the opportunity for independent breeding, or lack thereof (Zack 1990; Stacey & Ligon 1991; Macedo & Bianchi 1997) . The recognition that these hypotheses are merely the two sides of the same coin (Koenig et al. 1992; Emlen 1994 ) has so far not been fully incorporated in skew models of cooperative breeding, as the essential future component of the bene¢ts of philopatry has been lacking from these models. Our dynamic model formally integrates both factors in a single model of cooperative breeding and skew, by comparing both immediate and delayed advantages of staying versus dispersing using a common currency of lifetime inclusive ¢tness. Since greater survival probabilities enhance the expected bene¢ts of queuing, and thus reduce the need for reproductive concessions, our model predicts that cooperatively breeding groups are more likely to prove stable in long-lived species. In support of this prediction, a phylogenetic analysis of birds shows that switches to cooperative breeding are associated with decreases in annual adult mortality, and that low mortality predisposes cooperative breeding rather than vice versa (Arnold & Owens 1998) . Although it has been pointed out that low mortality leads to low population turnover, restricting opportunities for dispersal and independent breeding in long-lived species (Russell 1989; Rowley & Russell 1990) , our model shows that low mortality also has an inevitable direct e¡ect on group stability via increased importance of future versus current bene¢ts (as predicted by general life-history theory, Ro¡ (1992) ; this is also implicitly present in Rowley & Russell's (1990) argument that longlived birds can`a¡ord to wait' longer). Moreover, this e¡ect does not require that survival in groups is higher than that of solitary individuals, as queuing bene¢ts increase with overall survival even without any group size dependence in survival (¢gure 1).
We also predict that non-cooperative groups can form, where association leads to a decrease in current productivity. Subordinates may still stand to gain from group membership under these circumstances, as acquiring breeding positions by queuing may be more e¤cient than the attempt to establish a new territory (either because dispersing individuals face high mortality risks or because habitat saturation prevents their breeding or forces them to occupy secondary habitats). At the same time, the dominant may bene¢t from their presence either directly by improved survival (Rood 1990 ), or if they are related, may gain indirect bene¢ts by tolerating their presence (Brown & Brown 1984; Rowley & Russell 1990; Ekman et al. 1994; . Alternatively, the dominant may simply be unable to exclude unwelcome subordinates (Higashi & Yamamura 1993) . Studies of oystercatchers Haematopus ostralegus provide detailed and compelling evidence for`unproductive' associations of this kind, in which non-breeding individuals queue for breeding resources, but o¡er no help to established breeders (Ens et al. 1992 (Ens et al. , 1995 . Moreover, populations of many other vertebrate species contain a similarly large fraction of non-breeding`£oaters' (as predicted by ideal habitat selection theory when future bene¢ts are included, Kokko & Sutherland (1998) ). The presence of such £oa-ters can be detrimental to the breeding success of territorial individuals (Komdeur 1996 ; see also Macedo & Bianchi (1997) for an example of reduced breeding success in groups of several breeders).
Many aspects of social queuing are not yet incorporated in our simple model. Most signi¢cantly, the present analysis is restricted to an association of only two individuals. Concession-based models have, however, been developed for larger groups , and it would be of great interest to introduce dynamic considerations into these analyses; this would lead naturally to the question of how ecological factors a¡ect the maximum lengths of social queues. As an example, Kokko & Sutherland (1998) derive the expected pay-o¡ to remaining in a queue assuming k 1, r 0, complete skew, no dominant control over group membership, and either linear progress along the queue or completely random progress among equal subordinates. With these assumptions, the expected pay-o¡ to queuing when there are n subordinates in the group will be proportional both to local habitat quality and to ((17s D ) + n(17s S ))
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, and individuals are expected to disperse as soon as this value drops below x (i.e. from large groups, the threshold being smaller if local resources are meagre).
Apart from considering multi-member groups, there are several other factors which should be included in dynamic skew models to give insight into the rules of social queuing. First, queuing may become more complicated if incest avoidance prevents a subordinate from automatic inheritance of the breeding status when the same-sex dominant dies (Koenig et al. 1998) , or if individual di¡erences a¡ect queuing success (as assumed, for example, in the hypothesis of`queuing for status' through competitive helping, Zahavi (1990) ). Second, our simple model has assumed status, but not agedependent survival, even though the latter is likely to have an important in£uence on quantitative predictions regarding dispersal in long-lived species (Lucas et al. 1997) . Both the age of the dominant and the age of a subordinate can in£uence the ¢tness consequences of remaining in the group or of dispersing. Slight di¡er-ences in survival prospects have the largest e¡ect on ¢tness in cases where mean survival is high (¢gure 1; see also Ro¡ 1992) , so cooperative breeders with relatively low mortality are expected to be especially sensitive to such di¡erences.
Although we have formulated our dynamic skew model in terms of social breeding groups, comparison of the current and future bene¢ts of staying versus dispersing is relevant to any temporally stable group in which the bene¢ts of association are unequally shared. For example, there is strong similarity between con£icts over the partitioning of reproduction in cooperative breeders and con£icts over mating shares in lekking males (Widemo & Owens 1995; Kokko 1997) . Just like breeding groups, lekking associations can enjoy increased`group productivity' if females favour large aggregations over small ones (Sutherland 1996) . Moreover, queue-like behaviour is often documented in temporally stable lek sites (Wiley 1973; Rippin & Boag 1974; Moyles & Boag 1981; McDonald 1993; , so that stability of lekking groups will be strongly in£uenced by the possibility of subordinates acceding to dominant status in the future (Wiley 1991) . As in breeding groups, these delayed bene¢ts may favour queuing behaviour (in which subordinates accept a negligible share of matings) even when group members are unrelated (McDonald & Potts 1994) , and kinship will enhance stability still further (Kokko & Lindstro« m 1996; Ho« glund et al. 1999; Petrie & Burke 1999) .
Evolutionarily stable strategy models of reproductive skew have been praised for potentially providing a universal explanation for the organization of animal societies, ranging from colonies of eusocial insects to complicated social organizations in mammals and birds (Keller & Reeve 1994; Sherman et al. 1995) . While we agree that understanding group formation under con£icting interest requires a fully developed game-theoretical approach, we emphasize that a truly general model must consider all the consequences of the decisions that group members take: the direct and indirect bene¢ts of both current and future reproduction (Brown 1978) . Our analysis represents one step towards this dynamic theory of skew.
